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Table 2 The evolutionary game income matrix between health care organizations and elderly social care organizations

From: Evolutionary game model of health care and social care collaborative services for the elderly population in China

  

Health care organizations

 

Participation \(\left(y\right)\)

Nonparticipation \(\left(1-y\right)\)

Elderly social care organizations

Participation \(\left(x\right)\)

\({U}_{1}+{S}_{1}-{P}_{1}\)

\({U}_{2}+{S}_{2}-{P}_{2}\)

\({R}_{1}+{P}_{1}-{C}_{1}\)

\(0\)

Nonparticipation \(\left(1-x\right)\)

0

0

\({R}_{2}+{S}_{1}^{^{\prime}}-{C}_{2}\)

\(0\)