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Table 2 The evolutionary game income matrix between health care organizations and elderly social care organizations

From: Evolutionary game model of health care and social care collaborative services for the elderly population in China

   Health care organizations
  Participation \(\left(y\right)\) Nonparticipation \(\left(1-y\right)\)
Elderly social care organizations Participation \(\left(x\right)\) \({U}_{1}+{S}_{1}-{P}_{1}\) \({U}_{2}+{S}_{2}-{P}_{2}\)
\({R}_{1}+{P}_{1}-{C}_{1}\) \(0\)
Nonparticipation \(\left(1-x\right)\) 0 0
\({R}_{2}+{S}_{1}^{^{\prime}}-{C}_{2}\) \(0\)